Austin Hobbs v. The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, And State of Utah, Department of Transportation : Brief of Defendant-Respondent State of Utah, Department Of Transportation by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
Austin Hobbs v. The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company, And State of Utah, Department of Transportation : Brief 
of Defendant-Respondent State of Utah, Department Of 
Transportation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Stuart L. Poelman; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Hobbs v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, No. 19019 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4565 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 




THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, and STATE OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19019 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
JACKSON HOWARD 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
P. O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
ALAN L. SULLIVAN 
JEFFREY E. NELSON 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Suite 1600, 50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Railroad 
STUART L. POELMAN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. o. Box 3000 · 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
AttorneSS q>r 
Respon¥11t f·'l..::· k, LJ 
llUV 1 iC3J 
... 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Al STI HOBBS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DE!'NER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, and STATE OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19019 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
JACKSON HOWARD 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
P. o. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
ALAN L. SULLIVAN 
JEFFREY E. NELSON 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Suite 1600, 50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Railroad 
STUART L. POELMAN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. o. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent D.0.T. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY FOUND 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT D.O.T. WAS NOT 
NEGLIGENT IN THE SELECTION OF THE lST 
EAST CROSSING. . ......... . 
A. There Was No Substantial Evidence 
That D.O.T. Was Negligent in the 
Selection of the 1st East Crossing 
as a Detour Route. . . . . . . . . 
B. There was no Substantial Evidence 
That D.0.T. was Negligent in the 
Utilization of Warning Devices at 
the Crossing. 
POINT II. D.O.T. WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BY 
PLAINTIFF UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ITS FINDINGS AND ALLOCATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE 




Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm., 
465 P. 2d 534 (Utah 1970) 








. ... 12 




649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982) ..... · · ..... · 20 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (liti:lh llJBOJ ..... 19 
High v. The State L•ri '_., 
307 A.2d 799 (Del. 1971) -
Kohler v. Garden 6J4 162 (lltah l'J8l) 
11' 
2 1 
Little v. Utah State Division of Fam1lv Services, 
667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) ... -.... 18 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) . . . . . ..... 21 
Reirnchiissel v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26 
(Utah 1982) . . . . . . ........ 21 
STATUTES CITED 
§27-12-110, U.C.A. 19 
§41-6-95, U.C.A. 14' 16 
§54-4-15, U.C.A. 19 
§63-30-10 (1), U.C.A. 18 
§78-27-27, U.C.A. 21 




THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, and STATE OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19019 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff against Defendants 
State of Utah, Department of Transportation and Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company for injuries sustained in a 
truck-train accident which occurred in Price, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of a two-day trial, the Honorable Dennis 
Frederick, sitting without a jury, found in favor of both 
defendants and entered a no cause of action against Plaintiff. 
The court concluded that the actions of Plaintiff were the 
sole proximate cause of the accident and that neither defendant 
Rio Grande Railroad nor defendant State of Utah, Department of 
Transportation were negligent. (R. 381-387; 396). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Department of Transportation seeks affirmance of ltc 
judgment in its favor. 
STATEMU;T Cl!' FACTS 
Because this Court, in reviewing contentions of Plaintif'., 
must do so in a light most favorable to the lower court's 
findings and because the findings will not be disturbed by 
this Court if they are supported by substantial evidence, 
respondent State of Utah, Department of Transportation (here-
inafter "D.O.T. ") shall restate the Findings of Fact made by 
the lower court with appropriate record references. In additior. 
the Department would incorporate and adopt the "Statement of 
Facts" contained in the Brief of defendant Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company (hereinafter "Railroad"). 
The following Findings of Fact were made by the lower cour._ 
1. At about 10:00 p.m. on April 23, 1979, while drivino 
a coal-hauling tractor-trailer truck in connection with his 
employment, Plaintiff was involved in a collision with one of 
the Railroad's trains at the Railroad's crossing located 
between 2nd and 3rd South on 1st East in Price, Utah. (Tr. 46!, 
2. The 1st East crossing is composed of five sets of 
tracks. The northernmost of these tracks is the active or 
"mainline" track. It was on this track that the collision 
occurred. (Tr. 141). The tracks approach 1st East from a 
slightly east-southeasterly di rec ti on. (Tr. 589). The mainli 
track is straight for more than three-quarters of a mile to tlie 
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east of the 1st East crossing. (Tr. 62, 589). 
3. The Railroad's tracks also cross Carbon Avenue in 
l:'r l ce. (Ex. P-10). On the day of the accident, the Carbon 
crossing was closed because of repair work being per-
formed there at the direction of the D.O.T. (Tr. 480-485). 
The D.O.T. detoured traffic from Carbon Avenue to 1st East 
to permit Railroad and D.O.T. crews to complete the work, 
which was to take about three to five days. (Tr. 202). 
4. The D.O.T. made a decision to detour traffic from 
Carbon Avenue to 1st East. (Tr. 219). The decision was made 
after a meeting called by the D.O.T. on April 6, 1979, attended 
by representatives of the D.O.T., the Railroad, and Price City. 
(Tr. 190, 260, 273; Defendants' Ex. 29). At the meeting, it 
was determined that it would be impractical to permit traffic 
to continue across the Carbon Avenue crossing during the con-
struction. (Tr. 192-193). Another alternative considered at 
the meeting was the traffic be diverted to 1st West. (Tr. 232, 
248). However, the D.O.T. decided to detour traffic to 1st 
East for several reasons, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
(a) There was less existing traffic on 1st East 
than on 1st West; 
(b) The housing and population of children were 
less dense on 1st East; 
(c) The turns along the 1st East detour route 
were easier to negotiate, particularly for large trucks; 
and 
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(d) The 1st East crossinc; wac; 111 bc·ttcr cond1t io 1. 
and could Jn)r£' eas1l\ aC1'(_•r:1,>,i-1iL' 1,11t' cJdd1tional tratf1r, 
including the 10' '1"" r-c•a l t 1 1t1'f.• (T1. 231-" 
262' 286-289). 
The chosen detour diverted traffic traveling northbound on 
Carbon Avenue right (east) on Jrd South, left (north) on 1st 
East across the tracks to 1st South, left (west) on 1st South, 
then right (north) on Carbon Avenue. (Defendants' Ex. 26). 
5. Before the construction began, the warning signals at 
the 1st East crossing consisted of white "crossbuck" signs 
that had been there for many years. (Plaintiff's Ex. 5). 
The D.O.T. installed additional yellow railroad warning signs 
before the detour was imposed. (Ex. 30) . The Rai 1 road imposed 
a "slow" order during the construction, requiring its trains tc 
reduce their speed from 40 mph to 30 mph from milepost 619.0 to 
619.5 during the period of the construction. (Tr. 233, 306, 
369) . Milepost 619.0 was located about 100 feet east of the 
1st East crossing, and milepost 619.5 was located one-half 
mile west of milepost 619. 0. (Tr. 564). 
6. The train crew in the lead engine on the night of the 
accident consisted of the engineer (Martin Gasner) , the head 
brakeman (Gerald Leonard), and the road foreman of equipment 
(James Harvey) . (Tr. 364, 370, 399). Mr. Harvey's duties 
included the supervision and evaluation of the Railroad's 
crews, and he was seated in the lead engine on the night of 
the accident for the purpose, among others, of observing and 
evaluating the crew's performance. (Tr. 420, 560). 
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7. As the train approached Price on the night of the 
dc'Cldent, the train engineer reduced the speed of the train 
t rum a['S,rox1mately 60 mph to 40 mph or less in accordance with 
the applicable Price City ordinance. (Tr. 404, 564). The train 
engineer further reduced the speed of the train to 30 mph or 
less at milepost 619.0 in accordance with the Railroad's 
slow order. (Tr. 405, 433, 564). 
8. As the Railroad's train approached to within a quarter 
mile of the 1st East crossing, its locomotive bell was ringing, 
the fixed and oscillating headlights on the front of its loco-
motive were burning, and the train engineer sounded the standard 
whistle signal, composed of two long blasts followed by one 
short blast and one long blast. (Tr. 121, 151, 406, 414-415, 
417, 436-438, 492). 
9. On the night of the accident, Plaintiff drove north on 
Carbon Avenue, then followed the detour route that led him east 
on 3rd South, then north on 1st East. (Tr. 483-485). Plaintiff 
knew that the northernmost track was the mainline track and he 
was acquainted with the 1st East crossing because he crossed it 
traveling south earlier on the day of the accident. (Tr. 480). 
Furthermore, Plaintiff has crossed the Carbon Avenue crossing 
frequently during the six years he had worked for his employer 
before the accident. (Tr. 510, 523). 
10. As Plaintiff approached the 1st East crossing, he 
slowed his truck to approximately 3 to 5 mph, (Tr. 123) but 
failed to come to a complete stop at any point before or on the 
crossing. (Tr. 485, 514). Plaintiff had a clear view of the 
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approaching train for at least the li:ist 110 feet lJc·fore he· 
reached the mainline track, t fc,r " ''cry brief fJer1oci 
his view o f the l c J d C' n y i 11 c h' a :-: i_J I 1 t r u ( t c d b ':' a s t cJ. t i o 11. 1 1 
boxcar parked approx1mcitel\' 1•10 feet rasl ,,f the cross1n 
a storage track. (Tr. 53, 70, 341, G03, Plaintiff's Ex. 61 
After passing that obstruction, Plaintift had a clear view o! 
the approaching train for more than ten seconds before he 
reached the mainline track and with ample time to bring his 
truck to a stop. (Tr. 43-44, 63, 516, 585, 603-614). Plain-
tiff proceeded across the crossing at approximately 3 to 5 
mph and either failed to look or listen for the train or faile2 
to heed what he saw or heard as the train approached. 
486, 488, 514, 522, 569). 
(Tr. 6G, 
11. James Harvey, who was sitting in the left front seat 
of the train engine cab, saw Plaintiff's truck approaching the 
crossing but assumed that, because the truck was deceleratinq 
and approaching the crossing so slowly, Plaintiff intended to 
stop. (Tr. 566). Gerald Leonard, seated behind Mr. Harvey, 
also saw Plaintiff's truck approaching the mainline track. Whe: 
Mr. Harvey and Mr. Leonard realized that the truck was not go1r.: 
to stop before the mainline track, they simultaneously warned 
Martin Gasner. (Tr. 432, 567). At that time, the train could 
not be stopped short of the crossing. (Tr. 406). Mr. Gasner 
saw the truck and immediately applied the train's emergency 
brakes. (Tr. 422-428, 577, 582). 
The Findings of the lower court are contained at page 381-




THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY FOUND 
SllbSTM:TIAL EVIDENCE THAT D.O.T. 
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE SELECTION 
OY THE lST EAST CROSSING. 
It is difficult to determine from Appellant's Brief the 
exact basis of his appellate claims against defendant D.O.T. 
It is assumed that since the only role D.O.T. had in this 
accident was the selection of the 1st East crossing as a 
detour for Carbon Avenue, that this selection is the sole basis 
of Appellant's claim now before this Court. (See Appellant's 
Brief, p. 13-14). 
The statement of Plaintiff is incorrect that D.O.T. was 
involved with "repair work being conducted at the intersection 
where the accident occurred." (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). 
At the time of the accident the only repair work being performed 
by D.O.T. was at Carbon Avenue--not 1st East. It is clear that 
D.O.T. did not operate the railroad engine which was involved 
in the accident nor was it responsible for any actions or 
omissions of the Railroad. 
The claims of Appellant against D.O.T .therefore, can be 
divided into two categories: first, that D.O.T. was negligent 
in selecting the 1st East crossing as opposed to other alter-
natives; second, once the crossing was selected D.O.T. was 
negligent in not requiring additional warning devices at the 
crossing. These two contentions will now be discussed. 
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A. There Was No St..bstanlldl l'\'1dc11cr, 
That o.o.T. was NeC)Tl(icrit-rr:,-tTie 
Selection of the 1st Fast Crossina 
as a Detour Route. 
A re\'iew of the evidence shnl<':O t hzit f'laillt i ff '"f'"'it cl 
great deal of time an cl ef tort l 1r t lie lowr•r c()urt c<•r•: ci 111, 
the advantages and disadvant u'lc".s of lhe l st East '". ls t v;, 
railroad crossings. In aclditioll, Plaintiff continuously 
referred to the traffic patterns and signals utilized on 
Carbon Avenue in comparing it to both alternatives. If 
Plaintiff could have shown that the selection of the 1st 
East crossing breached a duty of D.O.T. to the motoring public 
then such an effort could be justified. However, the evidence 
is virtually undisputed that the 1st East crossing which was 
selected by D.O.T. was a sound and prudent decision in the 
discretionarly judgment of D.O.T. 
Because Plaintiff did not become involved in an accident 
on his route to the railroad crossing, the selection of the 
various roads which were utilized in reaching the crossing is 
immaterial to this lawsuit. For example, the claims of Plain-
tiff that additional turns or unsafe turns were required have 
no relevance in this litigation. The only possible relevance 
as to the detour route concerns the crossing itself. In other 
words, was the lower court justified in concluding that D.O.T. 
exercised reasonable care "in the choice of the detour route 
to 1st East." (Conclusion of Law No. 4). 
The evidence clearly shows that D.O.T. was justified in 
selecting the 1st East detour route while the Carbon Avenue 
-8-
crossinq remained closed. During the meeting in which D.O.T. 
representatives met with the Railroad and City representatives, 
the various options for rerouting were thoroughly discussed. 
Ll.llc· it is true as Plaintiff argues in his brief that the 1st 
West crossing had certain advantages over the 1st East crossing, 
it is equally true that there were advantages of the 1st East 
crossing over the 1st West crossing. As noted by the lower 
court in the Findings of Fact, these included the amount of 
traffic, the housing and population of children, the average 
speed of traffic, the number of turns that had to be made, the 
condition of the crossings, and the convenience of the detour 
to the general public. (Tr. 225-233, 533). 
There was no showing by Plaintiff that it was negligent 
for D.O.T. to expect cars or trucks to be able to safely pass 
across the 1st East intersection. This was not an instance 
where a vehicle was directed on a detour which was negligently 
designed and which caused the accident to occur. C.f. Bramel 
v. Utah State Road Comm., 465 P.2d 534 (Utah 1970). All of the 
roads used in the detour were already existing as was the 
railroad crossing itself. Here, the only purpose of the detour 
was to route traffic from one existing railroad crossing to 
another existing railroad crossing. There is no showing what-
soever that the decision was either negligent or that such 
decision proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. 
Plaintiff argues that because the traffic flow at the 1st 
Fast crossing increased from approximately 230 vehicles per day 
to over 11,000 vehicles per day then D.O.T. was somehow negli-
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gent in choosing this particular crossing. Such aro aryl•!l'C:it 
is without merit. Plaintiff produced no evidence that the l•· 
East crossing was inrar·able of hi.indlinci U.is additional Jc.,, 
of vehicles for a short three to five day period. C1L\' l r Ll.:_ 
thousands of cars and vehicles had utilized the 1st East 
crossing for many years prior to the temporary closure of tht 
Carbon Avenue crossing. Thus, while the increased number of 
cars may have caused congestion or some other traffic flow 
effect upon the crossino, Plaintiff produced no evidence 
that the crossing was made dangerous because of these 
cars. If anything, the fact that this number of cars was atlE 
to utilize the crossing during the detour period again showed 
that the decision to utilize the crossing was not negligent. 
More importantly, however, is the fact that the number c'. 
cars which utilized the crossing is completely irrelevant to 
this lawsuit. It is undisputed that at the time of the acci-
dent there was no other traffic traveling in the railroad 
crossing. Plaintiff himself admitted to this fact. (Tr. 529-
30). Whether there were 11,000, 100,000 or ten cars passing 
in the intersection that day is completely irrelevant to 
the facts of this accident in which only the plaintiff and 
the train were involved. 
The focus of Plaintiff upon the Carbon Avenue crossing 
is completely misplaced. The only factual relevance of the 
Carbon Avenue crossing is that Plaintiff would not have crosse: 
at 1st East had the Carbon Avenue crossing not been closed. 
However, this fact is no more relevant than to say that had 
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the pla1nt1ff eaten his lunch five minutes slower he would not 
have been at the crossing when the train passed. Thus, as to 
tile choice of the 1st East crossing itself there is no evi-
riE'rice of neyl1LJence or proximate causation to Plaintiff's 
inJuries. 
A case involving similar claims is High v. The State High-
way Dept., 307 A.2d 799 (Del. 1973). In that case the plaintiff's 
decedent was traveling on a detour which had been routed by the 
state highway department because of construction on the main 
highway. A jury verdict was entered in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the highway department for improperly detouring the 
traffic. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the evidence and 
concluded that judgment, as a matter of law, should be entered 
in favor of the highway department. The court noted that the 
traffic routing plan was prepared in accordance with the usual 
and normal provisions used by the highway department. The 
plaintiff, while acknowledging that normal procedures were 
undertaken, urged that additional steps should have been imple-
mented including the placement of guardrails, the erection of 
more signs, and the construction of a swing-around area. 
The court found that the highway department had correctly 
exercised its discretion in selecting the traffic routing plan 
that was utilized in this case. The Supreme Court of Delaware 
stated: 
We think it is clear that if there are two 
acceptable courses of action for the achievement 
of the same purpose, it is not negligence on the 
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part of a defendant to rurscl(' 
other. This Court rcc·t."Jrcized 
DeFilippo v. Pre"tun, 17' /\ ',) 
This was a rnPdil·dJ :-·-111 ),11 + 11 1 
that t11,• d1•c l • '1 I 
r•11l 1 ,1 t 11( i t ha11 t !1( 
th l c, I J l: IC 1 I l L' l ), 
1 ' I I '( I 1 q f' 1 I 
j ( .!l j ""''( lit ld 
Ii ''.II 
two acC'l"T i P\j :_..;til I I I t JI./ ( c..,:,r.1d ! 11,,t Lt 
made tl»c Las'' 
oi-,erat1on · .... 'o.s u11:-- 1)(-, 
r·h 211 
ii 
: : l']t If I t !,r 
t ,1 t ('j; 
We th1r1K, tt11t t•iL· } 1 la1rit1ff 
failed to n,akL' a issu» of ne,Jli-
gence for the J uri c:;1r1d t [ia l, cc1nSt'(Iucntly, 
on this ['hase of th<, cast• t),,. direction of a 
verdict for th<' defendant was f.'ro1,er. 
To the same E'ffect 1s Goston CC and New York 
Canal Co. v. Seaboard Co., 270 F. 
525 (1st Cir. 19211. We think, therefore, that it 
was error to refuse the highway department's motion 
for directed verdict. We point out that this con-
clusion is not based upon any concept of the doctrine 
of sovereign immunit·,,, which is specifically waived 
by 18 Del. C. §6509. This conclusion is based solelv 
upon our opinion that no issue of negligence was 
presented to be resolved b) the jury as to the highwai' 
department. The judgment against the state highway 
department will therefore be reversed. Id. at 850. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the instant case the lower court did not rule as a 
matter of law that D.O.T. had no liability. Ra the r, the court 
found as a trier of fact that the detour plan was reasonable 
and that D.O.T. exercised reasonable care in the choice of the 
detour route. There is no substantial evidence to the contrar 
and therefore the decision of the lower court as to this phase 
of its opinion must be sustained. 
B. There was no Substantial Evidence That 
D.0.T. was Negligent in the Utilization 
of Warnino Devices at the Crossing. 
A closely related claim to the one I''reviously discussc,,I 
is whether, after choosinq the !st Cast crossinq as the de•, 
route, D.O.T. was obl1qated to make additional warn1nq dev1cec 
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In other words, even it 
assumed that IJ.<>.T. was not negligent in selecting the 
1 l'ct ·re>ss1nc1 .:is an alternate route was it negligent in 
:c 1 t• ']urr l"'I ciddit1onal warning devices during the time the 
dPtour was in effect? 
Arpellant asserts that because the Carbon Avenue crossing 
utilized flashing lights and because improvements in the 
crossing with additional lights were being made that this 
required some type of signals to be installed on 1st East during 
the detour. (Appellant's Brief, p. 3, 11, 13-14). In addition, 
Plaintiff claims that to be a safe railroad crossing the 1st 
East intersection should have allowed traffic to pass at 30 
mph. (Appellant's Brief, p. 20). 
The comparison of the Carbon Avenue crossing to the 1st 
East crossing is inappropriate. The Carbon Avenue crossing was 
designed to carry a large load of traffic. As noted by 
Appellant himself, the crossing carried an average of 11,000 
cars a day. The purpose of the intersection and its warning 
systems was to allow a speedy flow of traffic across the railroad 
tracks except when trains were present. Thus, the 30 mph 
speed which was desirable for providing stability for trans-
versing traffic (Tr. 167) is only applicable to an "improved" 
railroad crossing. (Tr. 216). The purpose of the alternating 
electronic signals is to stop traffic only when trains are 
coming and to therPforc allow the smooth flow of traffic when 
trains are not present. 
on the other hand, the 1st East railroad crossing is similar 
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to thousands within thl '--· 1 !\1:.•" 
This is a low drns1t 
Rathe1, ll,c_-
motorist to r-ruJc-: 
the train to 
·. l t J '· 
I' 
,, It 1: 
ii 
I t j j l ) I d 1 I J: 
argument ad\'ariced """-1 LlJ,J, iri effect, require th1 
imposition of s1,'na1s lt intersection witL1' 
the State of l-tah of the nurlber of vehicles whu·! 
may use it in any oiven Such a sugacstion is both 
illogical and comr_letEcl" unc1ttciinaulc unless millions of 
in additional sianal enu1rment is appropriated for such use. 
It is clear that Utah law permits these type of inter-
sections on the assumrtior, that a motorist, once he is warnt".: 
that a railroad crossing exists, will exercise the type of ca: 
necessary to avoid an accident in conjunction with the same 
care utilized by railroad personnel. §41-6-95, L:.C.A. 
D.0.T. was not negligent in selecting the 1st East rail! 
crossing for the detour since its terrain and warning signs 
were more than adeqJate for observation of trains. The 
crossing had full visibilit; of all four quadrants of the 
crossing. (Tr. 2 ll ! . There WAS very little elevation 
difference in the tracks thereu; allowing full 
in all directons. 
Appendix herein). 
(Tr. 233). (Sep photogra!Jh contained in 
In addit1cn, thPrP well· acl·jUatc- 1-1arr111:.1 sians that t_!:·· 
railroad tracks were pre>oe11t l'11ur to the tracks on the 
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1 a\'rmcnt there were 12-inch wide cross-type or crosses with 
,·;mJ ol "RP". (Tr. 231). In addition there were "cross-
'," '-''r,icr, the existence of the railroad tracks 
'"' ,, vertical circular sign with the RR symbol. (Tr. 231). 
D.1 1 .T. felt that because of these warnings and because of the 
terrain of the crossing that additional warning devices would 
not be necessary. (Tr. 201). 
There can be no question from the record that the plaintiff 
was aware of the existence of the railroad tracks before he 
entered the crossing. The evidence is undisputed that he was 
completely familiar with the railroad tracks at the time of the 
accident. Plaintiff had traveled across these same tracks at 
the Carbon Avenue crossing for over six years and admitted that 
he knew trains generally used the northernmost track. (Tr. 511) 
He also admitted that he knew he was traveling over railroad 
tracks at the time of the accident and, in fact, had traveled 
over four sets of tracks before he was hit by the train on the 
fifth set. (Tr. 523). 
As to Plaintiff's claim that he should have been warned 
about the approach of the train, it is not the obligation of the 
D.O.T. in this type of intersection to give such a warning. 
Rather, it is the sole responsibility of the motorist and the 
train personnel to insure that they are both watching for each 
other's presence. Had this been a case in which a flashing 
signal was present but failed to activate when a train approached 
then Plaintiff would Justifiably have a claim against D.O.T. if 
1 t had the duty to maintain the device. Had Plaintiff shown that 
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the accident was caused b'/ thr 111f't f·,-1 ( 11 tr -i 1 fir f 1 
tlt' r(', t flt' TL Wd c 
j ! : I I .'. 1 ' t ! c_' (' (If ,-j JI' 
traffic. T'hus, l • rit 
Plain ti ff has si."'"' r l t 
to place a mechanic::i1 de'' ir ,3 f t0 1m'-:in ut L,'.'E:ry railru21, 
crossino in the state· VJhilc· Ln-c n•.3uires a motorist t 
stop for an electrical or mechanical signal device or for a 
human flagman, it alsu re<ic11rPs a m0torist to stop when a 
railroad train emits an audible signal or when an approachi: 
train is visible and is in a hazardous proximity to the 
crossing. §41-6-95, ·.c.A. 
The facts giving rise to this accident do not really 
concern defendant D.0.T. in that it merely routed the traffic 
to a perfectly usable railroad crossing in which adequate 
notice of the crossino was given. Whether Plaintiff was neoL· 
gent in failing to observe the train or whether the train per• 
were negligent in failing to adequately warn the plaintiff or 
failing to observe him does not concern the liability of 
the 0.0.T. 
Unlike the plaintiff in High, supra, Appellant produced 
no expert testimony that either the crossing was extra hazad: 
or required additional warning devices. As noted earlier, e\'' 
if such testimony had been rresented, the trial court is stil. 
able to rule as a matter of law in the tavor of the detour 
planning agency. Here, there was no evidence of any breach 
by D.O.T. in relying on the warnings in existence and upon t• 
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111 1!i vis 1bil i t1· of the crossing itself. 
Thus, the lower court correctly concluded that the D.0.T. 
1,,,.cJ rc-asc>ncJ),]1_' care in the choice of crossing protections 
•111, d ,11,cl iristal led at the first East crossing. (Conclusion 
ut I.aw !Jo. 4). It also concluded that the crossing was not 
extra hazardous because of volume of traffic, the nature of 
the crossing, the presence of obstructions, or because of other 
circumstances prevailing on the night of the accident. The 
court also correctly found that neither the D.O.T. nor the 
Railroad had a duty to place flagmen or additional warnings 
or protection at the 1st East crossing under the circumstances 
of Plaintiff's accident. (Conclusion of Law No. 5). 
These conclusions are based upon substantial evidence. 
Even if it is assumed arguendo that D.O.T. had some legal 
responsibility for the events occurring within the railroad 
crossing itself the evidence is clear that Plaintiff's conduct 
was the cause of the accident. The undisputed facts as to the 
warnings given by the Railroad as verified by two disinterested 
witnesses and the series of photographs showing the visibility 
of the railroad tracks during the 10 to 15 seconds which Plaintiff 
had available to observe, clearly supports the lower court's 
findings that Plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. (See photographs depicting time sequence of 
Plaintiff's approach to the mainline track contained in the 
1'.;-r,cndix herein). 
Substantial evidence exists to support the lower court's 
findings and conclusions. Regardless of what theory is utilized 
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by Plaintiff. the evidence s1rn1 l·, cl1·1 r:( 1 t :--, llf ·f 1 rt d t' 1.11., 
that D.O.T. was negligent in the "ar111n; to l'la1nt iff c,f t I" 
crossing or in the warning to Pla1nt1tf of the aµprouch111'1 
train. As suer, lr,r t !1< l,>'v.'< l ('('1Ur t 1 Jl [ 1 
favor shoulcl be'"' t,11i1CG. 
Fe' t :n l T , 
D.O.T. h'f,S IMMl:c,i_ FP0,,1 SL'IT BY PLAINTIFF 
UNDER THE GC'rVERNMF.tn'!d lMMIJ"ITY ACT. 
While the issue of governmental immunity was never 
by the lower court, respondent D.O.T. would assert that the 
decision to utilize the 1st East crossing was clearly a discrc-
tionary function and therefore D.O.T. is immune, as a matter 
of law, from any liabilit; in selecting that crossing. 
Section 63-30-10(1), U.C.A. provides that immunity shall 
not be waived if the negligent act or omission arises out of 
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion 
is abused. In the recent case of Little v. Utah State Divisicc 
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) this Court delirlea--
the requirements of a discretionary vs. a ministerial functioc 
This Court stated, "If the state posits immunity on such an 
exercise of discretion, it must make a showing that a 
balancing of risks and advantages took place." Id. at 51. 
Here, the April 6, 1979 meeting held by the D.O.T. was a clear 
illustration of how a balancing of risks and advantages 
In addition, this Court noted four other preliminary 
which must be answered. Again, all four are applicable in tt 
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CdS('. First, the decision of D.O.T. as to the improvement of 
tl1c, Carbon Avenue intersection and the route to be used during 
ttJt' detour involved a basic program of upgrading railroad 
l'''' 1sect1ons throucihtout the state. (Tr. 162-167). 
Secofld, the improvement work on the Carbon Avenue crossing 
and the requirement of rerouting the traffic was essential to 
the realization of the upgrading program. (Tr. 166-167). 
Third, the action of evaluating which crossings to upgrade 
and the detour routes to be utilized during the upgrading 
required the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, 
and expertise on the part of D.O.T. (Tr. 187-191, 208-218). 
Finally, D.O.T. was clearly possessed with the statutory 
authority to make the required upgrading of the intersection 
and to reroute the traffic during the upgrading. 
et seq. U.C.A.; §27-12-110, U.C.A. 
§54-4-15, 
The decision to perform work on the Carbon Avenue crossing 
and the concurrent decision to route the traffic during the 
construction period through 1st East was clearly a discretionary 
function on the part of the D.O.T. This was not a one-to-one 
dealing between the department and the plaintiff. Rather, the 
decision as to the highway improvement and routing had an impact 
"on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways." 
And as such, the D.O.T. is protected "from individual and class 
legal actions, the continual threat of which would make public 
administration all but impossible." Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 
517, 520(Utah1980). 
In the alternative, therefore, D.O.T., as a matter of law, 
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is immune from an\' rict j.( l 1 
tiff regarding 
THF TRI!cL c·tv; II: ';-fl·'!· 1· JT:-; 
FINDINGS J-i:a l\Ll l\.._,'\-;'J 1 1_11 :-:L l JCE'.J 1_'r_: 
AND A R.I:C'L'fS'i /\LI I 1 1, 1;; 
IS IMPROPER. 
! t 
The final point urJed b is that this Court 
should grant a new trial on the basis that the decision 
the lower court was against the weight of the evidence. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 14-19). In support Plaintiff relies 
upon a decision of the Surreme Court of Maine (Maise v. 
407 A.2d 310), a decision of the Florida Appellate Court 
(Kinsey v. Kell\', 312 So. 2d 461) and a decision of the Surre'."•f 
Court of Kisconsin (Lawver v. City of Park Falls, 151 N.W.2d 
68) • This argument and these authorities are not relevant 
to this case. 
There are many standards of appellate review throughout 
the United States. While some appellate courts consider the 
"weight of the evidence'' in reviewing a verdict or findinos 
of a lower court, this Court and the Constitution of Utah 
prohibit such review. In Christiansen v. Utah Transit 
649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982) an action was brought by the olainti'f 
against the defendant Utah Transit Authority seeking damane' 
for personal injuries. A Jury returned a verdict of 70% of 
negligence for the plaintiff and 30% for the defendant. 
plaintiff appealed. This Court affirmed the Jury verdict and 
rejected the same argument now being made by Appellant in the 
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This Court stated: 
Chr1•tiansen contends that the verdict is 
c(1 :trary to the clear weight of the evidence. 
Our scor,e of review in a law case does not permit 
us to determine that question. The Constitution 
of Utah, Art. VIII, §9 limits our review in cases 
at law to questions of law and thus we will not 
disturb a jury verdict on a factual question 
which is supported by any competent evidence. 
Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 
546 P. 2d 855 (Utah 1976); Nelson v. Peterson, 
542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975); Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Skeen, 328 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1959). !i..:_ at 45. 
The scope of review in this case is whether there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the findings 
and conclusions of the lower court. On appeal, this Court 
must consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings of fact and those findings are entitled 
to presumption of correctness and may not be overturned so 
long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. Reimchiissel v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26 (Utah 1982); 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); Piacitelli v. 
Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) 
Even the Federal Circuit case cited by Appellant (Scovill 
v. Missouri, 458 F.2d 639) held that a question for the jury 
existed as to the negligence of both the plaintiff motorist 
and the railroad. While in Scovill the finder of fact con-
eluded that the conditions were such that the plaintiff was 
not properly warned by the railroad and could not observe the 
train coming, the principle is still the same that the trier of 
fact decided the circumstances based upon all of the evidence. 
Here, the trier of fact found to the contrary but still con-
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sidered all of the evidence reldtlrJlJ t( 1 tl1L 1 t1r·r1:, uf thi 
parties. As such, a new t r1a 1 1 s not r·rut_11:_·l urde.ss t11c1 r l' 
no substantial evidence lUOCt if\' In'' t!" t 1 C'\ 'U l t 1 df'r' 1 
Finally, it sl1ou1d fJE- 11( 1t'1l tt1dt lJ1 (11\lL'l fr•r l'J,11j,t 
to prevail in any a1l}urnent co;-1ccrr11n•1 t Lt' 11ct f ( l T 1 ( t l ] I 1 
this Court would have tc, rletern,inc' t t1at there was r10 sulJs' '"'' 
evidence that Plaintiff was at least negligent at the 
of the accident. §78-27-27, U.C.A. Lven assuming arguend::i 
that the plaintiff was not the sole proximate cause of the 
accident it would still be Plaintiff's burden to prove that he 
was less than 50% at fault. D.O.T. submits that this conclusic 
cannot be reached by any review of the evidence utilizing any 
standard. 
Quite clearly, Plaintiff failed to make any effort to 
observe or hear sights and sounds which were seen and heard by 
others including disinterested witnesses. Since the Railroad 
performed all of the statutory requirements of warning there 
can be no doubt that Plaintiff was at least 50% negligent in 
failing to observe and heed these warnings regardless of any 
conduct or misconduct on the part of the defendants. 
For these reasons, therefore, the trial court did not err 
in its findings nor is there any justification to remand this 
case for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
While Plaintiff has presented an interesting case on ilJ"l't' 
involving numerous alleged issues, a breakdown of the 
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issues shows that there is no valid argument made by Plaintiff. 
Fur example, the facts surrounding the 1st West crossing and 
tt." \.irhon !wc·nuc crossing have no materiality to this appeal 
what SUE''.'L·r. 
Why Pla1nt1f f reached the 1st East crossing is of no 
importance. The traf f1c history of the crossing on that day 
is of no importance. The only question of relevance is whether 
D.O.T. breached any duty to Plaintiff at the exact moment that 
the crossing was attempted. 
There is substantial evidence supporting the lower court's 
conclusion that no such duty was breached--neither in initially 
selecting the detour route or in the warnings that were present. 
In any event, D.O.T. is immune from prosecution because of the 
discretionary role this activity invoked. 
The decision of the court is fully justified by the evidence. 
The decision should be affirmed. 
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Lxl11b1 t D-52 view of plaintiff 13. 2' from mainline rail 
3 C,c·corids before accident. (Truck = locomotive) 
I. 
Cxh;c.c D-50 v;ew of 
seconds before accident. (Truck 
f 
Exhibit D-44 view of plaintiff 66' feet from mainline rail and 
seconds before accident. (Truck = locomotive) 
;. 
. 11" I 11-cJc v1c·VJ uf 11la1ntiff 110' from mainline rail and 
1 r11....1 lJ1 fut-c' dcc1dL>r1t. (Truck = locomotive) 
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